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Abstract
In 2014, as part of the Global Health Security Agenda, Ethiopia was provided the technical and 
financial resources needed to prioritize antimicrobial resistance (AMR) in the national public 
health sphere. Under the direction of a multi-stakeholder working group, AMR surveillance was 
launched in July 2017 at 4 sentinel sites across the country. The AMR surveillance initiative in 
Ethiopia represents one of the first systematic efforts to prospectively collect, analyze, and report 
national-level microbiology results from a network of hospitals and public health laboratories in 
the country. Baseline readiness assessments were conducted to identify potential challenges to 
implementation to be addressed through capacity-building efforts. As part of these efforts, the 
working group leveraged existing resources, initiated laboratory capacity building through 
mentorship, and established infrastructure and systems for quality assurance, data management, 
and improved coordination. As a result, AMR surveillance data are being reported and analyzed 
for use; data from more than 1,700 patients were collected between July 2017 and March 2018. 
The critical challenges and effective solutions identified through surveillance planning and 
implementation have provided lessons to help guide successful AMR surveillance in other 
settings. Ultimately, the surveillance infrastructure, laboratory expertise, and communication 
frameworks built specifically for AMR surveillance in Ethiopia can be extended for use with other 
infectious diseases and potential public health emergencies. Thus, building AMR surveillance in 
Ethiopia has illustrated how laying the foundation for a specific public health initiative can 
develop capacity for core public health functions with potential benefit.
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THE GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITY AGENDA (GHSA) was launched through a partnership of more 
than 64 nations and international stakeholders in February 2014 to pursue multilateral and 
multisectoral approaches to strengthening the capacity of individual nations to prevent, 
detect, and respond to infectious diseases threats. GHSA has worked to elevate global health 
security as a national and global priority.
Antimicrobial resistance (AMR) is a global health threat that was recognized in the 2016 
United Nations General Assembly call for action.1 Resistance occurs when microorganisms 
change to render an antibiotic ineffective; AMR pathogens can become epidemic, contribute 
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to increased patient morbidity and mortality, and have substantial negative economic 
impacts.2 While AMR occurs in all countries, the burden of AMR and the emergence of 
novel resistance is disproportionately concentrated in low- and middle-income countries.3 
However, the lack of microbiology capacity and public health surveillance infrastructure in 
many low- and middle-income countries limit the ability to detect, respond, and ultimately 
prevent AMR. To address this need, the GHSA prioritized combating antimicrobial 
resistance and establishing a national laboratory system to improve access to quality 
microbiology and help establish AMR surveillance systems.4
A 2009 report by the Drug Administration and Control Authority of Ethiopia concluded that, 
while data were limited, evidence suggested a high level of antibacterial resistance, and it 
called for a national approach to prevent further AMR development and spread in Ethiopia.5 
Subsequent work identified limited microbiology laboratory capacity and capability and the 
lack of a systematic national AMR surveillance system to be principal limitations to 
effective AMR response in Ethiopia.6 The country was provided access to technical 
resources and funding mechanisms through GHSA to establish AMR surveillance and AMR 
control as national public health priorities.
Developing a surveillance system that can quantify and monitor AMR is expected to benefit 
the communities it serves by informing clinical decisions and helping to guide public health 
actions to effectively prevent and contain the spread of resistant pathogens. Additionally, the 
surveillance infrastructure, national leadership, laboratory expertise, and communication 
frameworks built specifically for AMR surveillance can be extended to the monitoring of 
other infectious diseases and can be valuable in an effective national response to many 
public health emergencies. This article describes how laboratory-based AMR surveillance 
was implemented in Ethiopia, discusses critical challenges, and provides lessons learned to 
help guide successful AMR surveillance in other settings.
AMR Surveillance Working Group
There are many different strategies for establishing public health surveillance of AMR. 
Surveillance can target microbial pathogens (microorganisms that have caused illness), 
commensals (microorganisms living in or on living things without causing illness), or 
organisms from the environment. In addition, strategies can be human-centric, animal-
centric, or environmental (One Health approach). Efforts may focus on detecting and 
describing antibiotic treatment failures (pathogens that have survived and continued to cause 
illness despite appropriate antibiotic treatment), phenotypic susceptibility (organisms’ 
inability to grow in a laboratory in the presence of carefully measured amounts of 
antibiotics), or genetic markers of resistance (bits of genetic information associated with 
resistance to different antimicrobials). Finally, surveillance systems can be designed to 
represent smaller well-defined populations, such as a single health facility; describe larger 
populations more generally, such as nations or states; or systems may simply strive to gain 
an understanding of circulating resistance without representing any defined population. Each 
strategy has strengths and limitations, and most systems ultimately represent a mix of 
strategies, but virtually all AMR surveillance requires accurate and reliable microbiology as 
the primary source of data.
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In 2016, an AMR surveillance working group was formed in the Ethiopian Public Health 
Institute (EPHI), with support from the Food Medicine and Health Care Administration and 
Control Authority of Ethiopia (FMHACA). Technical assistance and coordination were 
provided through international partnerships with the US Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC) Division of Global Health Protection and Division of Healthcare Quality 
Promotion. Contract support for specific AMR activities was provided by the American 
Society for Microbiology (ASM) and the Ohio State University (OSU) Global One Health 
initiative. The key objectives of the AMR surveillance working group were:
1. Develop a national AMR surveillance plan for Ethiopia.
2. Implement, in phases, national AMR surveillance in Ethiopia.
3. Ensure AMR surveillance data are of actionable quality.
4. Establish the infrastructure to transport isolates from surveillance sites for 
centralized confirmation testing and storage.
Implementation milestones achieved by the Ethiopian AMR surveillance working group are 
summarized in Figure 1.
The National AMR Surveillance Plan
Balancing available resources with a national focus on One Health AMR strategies 
embracing human, animal, and environmental sources, the AMR surveillance working group 
decided to start with a human-centric approach to allow the use of existing clinical 
laboratory services as the primary data source. The surveillance strategy that was developed 
adhered to the guidance provided by the World Health Organization (WHO) Global 
Antimicrobial Resistance Surveillance System (GLASS) framework. AMR surveillance 
targeting animal and environmental sectors will be incorporated when those relevant data 
sources are available.
Surveillance efforts have initially focused on capturing patient and isolate data related to 
specimens routinely referred for microbiological evaluation. Because clinical laboratories in 
Ethiopia rely primarily on manual microbiology methods and molecular methods are 
infrequently performed, AMR surveillance was limited to phenotypic susceptibilities in 
clinically relevant pathogens. Data capture was limited to patients submitting a specific set 
of specimen types (ie, urine and pus) and targeted pathogens (ie, Escherichia coli, Klebsiella 
pneumonia, and Staphylococcus aureus). These specimen and pathogen sets were considered 
to be of local clinical and epidemiologic importance, required microbiology capacity, and 
were highlighted as important in GLASS. It is important to note that while surveillance 
efforts targeted a few pathogens, laboratories continued to test for all clinically relevant 
pathogens. As capacity increases, the surveillance program may be expanded to additional 
specimen and pathogen sets or to include linkage to infections and clinical syndromes that 
would provide data on the burden of AMR in Ethiopia.
The AMR working group devised a nodal sentinel surveillance structure because of the 
decentralized Ethiopian public healthcare system in which health sector authority is 
primarily held at the regional and district (woreda) levels.7 Based on regional needs and 
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interest, regional- or district-level public health laboratories, which provide both reference 
and clinical testing services to a number of sentinel healthcare facilities, can serve as 
reporting nodes that interact directly with the AMR Surveillance National Coordinating 
Center (NCC). Additionally, higher functioning sentinel healthcare facilities with in-house 
microbiology services can operate independently of the regional- or district-level reporting 
nodes and can report directly to the NCC, which in turn can provide support and reference 
testing. As the NCC, the National Reference Laboratory (NRL) at EPHI supports 
implementation, ensures coordination, and helps facilitate resource allocation to all facility-, 
regional-, and district-level reporting nodes. Figure 2 provides a diagram of possible 
reporting structures providing AMR surveillance data.
Following a comment and review period, the Ethiopian Federal Ministry of Health approved 
their National AMR Surveillance Plan for implementation in April 2017.
AMR Readiness Assessment and Site Selection
In order to target resources required for early implementation, AMR surveillance was 
initially established in a small select group of surveillance sites, including both directly 
reporting healthcare facility–level nodes and district- or regional-level reporting nodes, with 
improved national representativeness through phased expansion. Site selection started with 
the identification of laboratories currently processing clinical microbiology samples. Of the 
35 laboratories identified, 16 were prioritized for implementation based on existing 
laboratory capacity, number of urine and pus samples submitted, and a willingness to 
participate. AMR readiness assessments were then conducted to evaluate relevant laboratory 
practices including specimen management, quality microbiological testing, and laboratory 
information management. Readiness assessments were performed using standardized tools 
developed by CDC’s International Infection Control Program (IICP) and ASM. Assessments 
included direct observation, review of laboratory documentation, and interviews with staff 
and administrators.
Surveillance readiness assessments revealed that, despite clinical microbiology being 
conducted, improved laboratory capacity was needed to ensure the available data were 
consistently interpretable and useful in a surveillance context. In general, assessment 
findings identified the following gaps with the potential to affect data use:
• A lack of standardized procedures for quality assurance and quality control 
practice;
• Limited laboratory staff training and experience in microbiology;
• Limited access to reliable reagents and essential microbiology supplies and 
equipment; and
• Inefficient data management and reporting.
The identified limitations led to a 3-phase approach for site implementation. Phase 1 
includes 4 sites, phase 2 includes 6 sites, and phase 3 includes 6 additional sites. 
Implementation phase assignment was based on current laboratory capacity, readiness to 
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participate, and geographic location, with the goal of efficient targeting of laboratory 
capacity building and more rapid surveillance implementation.
Mentorship and Laboratory Capacity Building
Following the identification of phase 1 sites, repeat site visits were conducted to specify 
laboratory deficiencies, determine resources available, and collaborate with laboratory staff 
to establish a 1-year capacity building work plan for each site, including the NRL. The 
hallmark of all these work plans was the establishment of individual laboratory mentorship 
led by ASM. While costly, direct 1-on-1 mentorship provided the individualized guidance 
required to address the many types of issues made evident by the readiness assessments. 
Mentorship helped identify and leverage individual site strengths and promote creative ad 
hoc solutions to challenging issues. Lastly, in place of a rigid set of requirements for 
participation, site mentors were able to recommend sites for inclusion based on ongoing 
process improvement resulting in more rapid surveillance scale-up.
Laboratory mentorship involved quarterly onsite visits from experienced microbiologists for 
a minimum of 2 weeks. Mentorship visits were coordinated by EPHI-NRL and an ASM 
consultant with local expertise in project management and microbiology, using tools and 
materials developed by working group members. These materials included antibiotic panels 
and standard operating procedures (SOPs) aimed at standardizing microbiology and 
reporting methods. All mentored sites were enrolled in an internationally recognized 
external quality assurance (EQA) program to help monitor and quantify improved 
capabilities over time. In addition, sites were provided with relevant quality control (QC) 
strains as needed and licensed Clinical and Laboratory Standards Institute (CLSI) guidelines 
for results interpretation and reporting.
The short-term objective of laboratory capacity building was to move enrolled sites toward 
providing reliable surveillance data, with an ultimate goal of achieving international 
accreditation in microbiology. As of June 2018, the NRL had attained international ISO 
15189;2012 accreditation, and 1 additional phase 1 site was preparing to be assessed for 
accreditation. To help ensure laboratory quality improvement efforts are sustained, EPHI-
NRL has been gradually capacitated to take leadership of the laboratory mentorship 
activities. EPHI-NRL staff accompany and support the ASM staff during quarterly 
mentorship visits and have begun to conduct independent interim site visits to meet this 
objective.
Microbiology Supplies and Equipment
Purchasing and inventory of supplies and equipment has been identified as a long-standing 
limitation for clinical microbiology in many low- and middle-resource settings.8 The lack of 
a full complement of reagents, standard microbiology supplies, and the equipment required 
for culture, identification, and antibiotic susceptibility testing was a critical limiting factor at 
all sentinel sites. Due to the need to ensure timely availability of essential supplies and 
equipment for rapid surveillance scale-up, the working group created a list of essential 
bacteriology reagents and supplies and obtained a 6-month to 1-year supply for each sentinel 
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site from established international sources. For long-term sustainability, this essential list 
was used to negotiate with the central procurement agency of Ethiopia to help ensure 
uninterrupted availability moving forward. Laboratory equipment was assessed at each site 
and was replaced or repaired as needed. Additionally, a system to capture and document 
issues pertaining to the quality and availability of supplies was established to improve 
communication between laboratories and allow more coordinated response to supply issues.
Clinical Sensitization and Specimen Management
To support efforts to increase laboratory capacity, a series of semi-structured clinical 
assessments led by Ohio State University examined specimen management and current 
diagnostic microbiology stewardship practices (the ordering, performing, and reporting of 
diagnostic tests). Issues identified through these clinical assessments fit into 4 thematic 
categories:
• Low utilization of microbiology services
• Variable quality of clinical specimens
• Specimen collection restricted to patients failing empiric antibiotic treatment
• Common preadmission antibiotic use limiting utility of microbiological testing
A combined surveillance introduction for key clinicians and training workshop on 
microbiology clinical specimen collection best practices was developed. The training 
emphasized the importance of appropriate sample collection for use by healthcare facilities 
and the national AMR surveillance initiative. For long-term sustainability, training materials 
and job aids supporting the ongoing training of frontline clinical staff were developed. An 
annual training of trainers program targeting facility-level training staff was established to 
provide guidance in using the developed materials and to promote effective methods of adult 
learning.
National Coordinating Center and Reference Laboratory
An unintended consequence of Ethiopia’s decentralized public health laboratory system has 
been the underuse of the national bacteriology reference laboratory at EPHI. The nodal 
sentinel surveillance strategy Ethiopia selected for AMR surveillance requires substantial 
centralized capacity to provide system coordination, ensure data quality, coordinate data 
management, and for dissemination and use of results. The national bacteriology reference 
laboratory at EPHI needed additional assistance to fulfill their vision of being a national 
coordinating center for AMR surveillance. EPHI participated in early efforts to train and 
redistribute staff, sought laboratory mentorship, established formal and informal lines of 
communication with surveillance sites, and improved the supply systems within the AMR 
surveillance sentinel network. Their efforts were ultimately successful in preparing the 
EPHI-NRL to fulfill its role as the national coordinating center for AMR surveillance. To 
ensure long-term sustainability of the AMR surveillance and laboratory mentorship 
programs, the NRL is continuing to advocate for dedicated staff and resources from EPHI 
and ministry of health leadership.
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Due to a lack of established procedures and the logistics required for specimen and isolate 
transport, bacteriology at EPHI-NRL had limited opportunity to engage in reference 
(providing testing for unknown isolates sent from limited capacity laboratories) or 
confirmation testing (retesting isolates for results comparison). An innovative but limited 
public-private partnership between EPHI and the Ethiopian postal service had successfully 
implemented specimen referral and transport of HIV and TB isolates within a nationwide 
laboratory network.9 Expansion of this program to allow transport of the bacterial isolates 
and clinical specimens to support AMR referral and confirmation testing are planned with 
preliminary testing under way.
Data Management and Analysis
When AMR surveillance began, none of the phase 1 sites used a digital laboratory 
information management system for microbiology. Evaluations of the laboratory data flow at 
each sentinel site revealed varied paper-based data management with no consistent 
methodology for AMR surveillance data capture. Small pilot projects exploring the 
integration of WHONET software for surveillance site data entry were initially challenging 
because of the perceived disruption to existing workflow and increased workload. 
Ultimately, individualized solutions for data entry were created to ensure data collection was 
integrated with existing practices and was acceptable to laboratory staff and management. 
Data collection was ultimately accomplished by establishing a site-specific digital 
WHONET database at each site but allowing paper-based data capture based on existing 
laboratory forms with final database entry facilitated by the NCC. While not required by the 
system, sentinel site staff were provided basic training on digital data entry, data 
management, and data analysis to promote digital collection and the use of microbiology 
data in the future.
All data analyses are performed at the NCC using the freely available WHONET software 
and a spreadsheet program (eg, Microsoft Excel) as needed for improved visualization of 
results. Site-specific analyses, including calculation of hospital-level patterns of resistance 
and antibiograms are completed and periodically returned to individual sites as the number 
of tested isolates allows. Anonymized aggregate results will be used for national and 
international AMR reporting. However, the data systems at sentinel sites and at the NCC 
will continue to be reevaluated, and improvements may be needed.
Initial AMR Surveillance Findings
As of March 2018, all 4 phase 1 surveillance sites—including 2 healthcare facility-level 
nodes, 1 regional-level node servicing multiple healthcare facilities, and the clinical testing 
performed at EPHI in support of several local healthcare facilities—were reporting AMR 
surveillance data. From July 2017 to March 2018, the system received patient and isolate 
data on 1,786 urine and pus specimens, collected from 1,767 patients. Sites providing 
sufficient data have been provided with preliminary antibiograms, and surveillance activities 
and findings are individually discussed with each site during regular NCC-led calls and site 
visits. The first formal AMR surveillance report is expected in July 2018. The government 
plans to promote use of these surveillance results to develop facility-level cumulative 
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antibiograms, guide national stewardship policies, and continue to improve quality of 
microbiology services that have a direct impact on patient care.
The initial procurement of microbiological supplies was received and dispensed to the 
sentinel sites, and all have an active ongoing mentorship with ASM. Due to inconsistencies 
in performance of baseline EQA testing, we are still unable to quantify improvement; 
however, EQA performance has been systematized with corrective work plans based on 
results provided following each round. Changes in the number or quality of submitted 
clinical microbiology specimens to site laboratories has not been measured because of 
logistical challenges. Qualitatively, early engagement with clinicians at the sentinel sites has 
resulted in continued engagement around both laboratory use and the importance of 
appropriate specimen collection. The training of trainers program designed to provide a 
model of sustainable facility-level specimen collection training for clinical staff was 
developed based on needs expressed through this initial engagement.
Building on Success
The AMR surveillance initiative in Ethiopia represents one of the first systematic efforts to 
prospectively collect, analyze, and report national-level microbiology results from a network 
of healthcare facilities and public health laboratories in the country.
Developing a common vision for AMR surveillance allowed public health leaders 
throughout the Ethiopian public health system to constructively discuss and debate current 
limitations in laboratory infrastructure, microbiology supply procurement, laboratory data 
quality, and the far-reaching implications of the lack of information technology and digital 
laboratory information management systems. Through the implementation of AMR 
surveillance, GHSA provided access to the funding and the technical expertise needed to 
sustainably address some of these issues, thus building public health capacity through the 
performance of core public health functions. Following the successful initiation of AMR 
surveillance, the Ethiopian AMR working group identified several potential areas for 
growth:
• Expansion of surveillance activities to additional sentinel sites
• Establishment of bacterial isolate and specimen transport between peripheral 
laboratories and the reference laboratory at EPHI
• Exploration of alternative AMR surveillance strategies, including an isolate-
based referral system in which participating laboratories submit presumptively 
identified isolates for confirmation of culture identification and antibiotic 
susceptibility testing; and/or time-limited surveillance, where laboratory capacity 
is temporarily augmented to provide reliable quantification of resistance over 
relatively short time periods
While substantial work remains, the implementation of AMR surveillance in Ethiopia has 
already provided public health tools and resources with potential value in national 
emergency response. The nodal sentinel surveillance structure itself provides a new 
framework embracing both direct healthcare facility reporting as well as information flow 
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along established hierarchical public health laboratory structures. The surveillance 
infrastructure and relationships developed should facilitate the otherwise difficult 
establishment of the ad hoc disease monitoring and information systems that are needed for 
rapid response. Additionally, the increases in microbiology capacity have begun to create a 
system of laboratory “centers of excellence” with increased access to high-quality 
microbiology supplies, equipment, and training that are now available for national laboratory 
surge capacity.
Finally, the communication networks and regular systematic reporting naturally established 
through surveillance implementation allows opportunities for astute laboratorians and 
clinicians to report small problems to public health authorities before they come large public 
health emergencies. In short, building AMR surveillance in Ethiopia provides an example of 
how laying the foundation for a specific public health initiative has developed capacity for 
core public health functions with far-reaching potential benefits for global health security.
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Figure 1. 
Implementation milestones for the Ethiopia AMR surveillance working group through July 
2018
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Figure 2. 
Diagram of the nodal reporting structures providing surveillance data to Ethiopia’s national 
AMR surveillance system
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